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INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN NEW YORK:
STATUTORY TEXT AND COMMERCIAL
PRACTICE
Carlos L. Israelsf
The subject matter of article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code is
"securities" as defined in section 8-102:1
A. as "negotiable instruments" in the historic sense; and
B. with respect to the obligation of an issuer of registered form
securities (e.g., the typical stock certificate) to register changes of owner-
ship on transfer books.
Perhaps no assumption is more generally made in our free securities
markets than that all instruments which would fit within the catchall
phrase "commonly known as a 'security"" are "negotiable," so that
a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice-even a purchaser
from a thief-would take the instrument free of defenses of the issuer
and equally free of claims or equities of prior ownership.' Against the
factual background in which the question arises, the assumption is usu-
ally justified today. The need for legislation to confirm it on a broad
basis arose from the restrictive definition of a "negotiable instrument"
in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law4 which effectively excluded
from the category all nonmoney paper, all registered form securities,
income bonds, revenue bonds and other forms of investment media of
demonstrated usefulness in the economy.
As to the most important species of nonmoney paper-the conventional
certificate of stock-the situation was largely met by the promulgation
f CAmos L. IsRAELs, BA. 1925, Amherst College, LL.B. 1928, Columbia Law School
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1 Section 8-102 (a) A "security" is an instrument which
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or com-
monly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series
of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise
or evidences an obligation of the issuer.
2 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1959).
3 These two aspects of negotiability were first clearly distinguished by Chafee, "Rights
in Overdue Paper," 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1104 (1918). Their separate treatment is basic to
Uniform Commercial Code articles 3 (Commercial Paper) and 8 (Investment Securities).
4 Herein cited as "NIL"; requiring that an instrument "to be negotiable" must among
other things "contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.
on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time; . . . to order or to bearer" NIL § 1,
N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 20.
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and nationwide adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. New
York adopted that act in 1913., Under the USTA the negotiability of
stock certificates as to claims or equities of ownership is clearly estab-
lished. As to issuer's defenses the USTA is silent, but in New York at
least, case law appears to protect the innocent purchaser for value.6
The problem remained ubiquitous in the Empire State as to other fypes
of instruments until President and Directors of the Manhattan Co. v.
Morgan was decided.7 In the Morgan case the court of appeals clearly
negated the power to create "negotiability by contract." The legislative
reaction was prompt and sweeping. It took the form of an amendment
to the Personal Property Law' providing that "security receipts," "equip-
ment trust certificates," and "corporate bonds" [each defined in terms,
which taken in the aggregate, substantially blanket the field] transferred
in bearer form or properly indorsed confer upon a purchaser for value
"without notice of prior defenses or equities or claims of ownership...
absolute title thereto free of any defenses enforcible against or claims
of ownership of the signer or any prior holder."9
With respect to the issuer's obligation to register transfers, the need
for legislation arose from a long history of American case law holding
the issuer responsible (a) for the genuineness of the signature of the
indorser, and where he signs for another, for his authority to sign; and
(b) for the rightfulness of the transfer for the purposes of which change
of registration was sought.
As to genuineness of signature and authority to sign, the issuer's
liability was absolute and, in the organized securities markets, came to
be insured against by the universal requirement of a "guaranty of signa-
ture" by a securities broker or dealer or a bank.' ° The warranty of the
guarantor of signature covers both genuineness and authority to sign. "
The system has worked well and is specifically codified in article 8 which
states the guarantor's warranties, and permits the issuer to require as to
each necessary indorsement "a guarantee of the signature . . . signed
s N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 162-85 herein cited as "USTA."
6 See Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879); Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc
Co., 57 N.Y. 616 (1874). Cf. Goldan v. Delaware & E. Ry., 144 App. Div. 78, 128 N.Y.
Supp. 936 (1st Dep't 1911).
7 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
8 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 260-62. A year later, "bearer shares" were by statute (N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law § 186) equated to registered form certificates governed by the USTA.
9 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 261(3).
10 Rule 209 of the Rules of the Board of Governors of the N.Y. Stock Exch. for the
Settlement of Contracts requires that the guarantor be a firm or corporation which is
a member of the Exchange, or a New York City bank. In practice however the guarantee
is often placed on the security by correspondent banks or brokers at whose request the
member firm or New York bank adds its own guarantee.
11 Jennie Clarkson Home for Children v. Meissouri K. & T. R.R., 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E.
571 (1905).
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by or on behalf of a person reasonably believed by the issuer to be
responsible."'11
As to rightfulness of transfer the liability of either purchaser or issuer
was conditional, attaching only when "actual" or "constructive" notice,
e.g., of potential delivery in breach of fiduciary obligation could be" found.
The NIL purports to protect the purchaser unless he had "knowledge
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith."' 3 The rule of the case law, however, particularly in the fiduciary
situation, was more stringent: the mere fact of fiduciary ownership
known to purchaser or issuer (a fortiori, appearing on the face of the
certificate as from registration in the name of "Richard Roe, Trustee")
or of signature of the indorsement by an agent was in and of itself effec-
tive to require the fullest practical investigation, and to charge the pur-
chaser or issuer as the case might be with knowledge of all facts which
such investigation would have disclosed. 4
In 1937 New York adopted sections 3 and 4 of the Uniform Fidu-
ciaries Act 5 purporting to relieve the issuer of any duty of inquiry where
registration is into or out of fiduciary name unless it had "knowledge of
such facts that the action in registering the transfer amounts to bad
faith."" The decisions, however, indicated little if any relaxation of the
pre-statutory rules. 7
Finally in 1959 New York enacted the Uniform Act for Simplification
of Fiduciary Security Transfers' 8L-a broad "exoneration" statute under
which no issuer is bound to make inquiry as to the rightfulness of any
transfer into or out of fiduciary name unless it receives timely written
notice of "a claim of beneficial interest adverse to the transfer." Having
received such notice the issuer registers the transfer at its peril unless
it notifies the adverse claimant by registered or certified mail at the
12 Sections 8-312, 8-402(1) (a) and (2). The issuer may adopt standards as to responsi-
bility, provided they are not "manifestly unreasonable." § 8-402(2).
13 Section 56; assuming, of course, compliance with the other requirements for "holder
in due course" status as set forth in § 52.
14 Many cases could be cited in illustration. Some of the clearest are First Nat'l Bank v.
National Broadway Bank, 156 N.Y. 459, 51 N.. 398 (1898); West v. Tintic Standard Min-
ing Co., 71 Utah 158, 263 P. 490 (1928) ; Geyser Marion Gold Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed.
558 (8th Cir. 1901); Clark & Wilson Lumber Co. v. McAllister, 101 F.2d 709 (9th Cir.
1939); Jennie Clarkson Home for Children v. Missouri, K. & T. R.R., supra note 11. A
nonuniform provision of N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 95 protects a bank honoring a
corporate check or other instrument drawn by an officer to his own order where his authority
to do so is evidenced by a resolution filed with the bank.
15 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 359j-k, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937 ch. 344, repealed by N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1959, ch. 150.
16 The language appears in each of former §§ 359j and 359k.
'7 See, e.g., Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1939), and Harris v.
General Motors Corp., 263 App. Div. 261, 32 N.Y.S.2d 556 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 288 N.Y.
691, 43 N.E.2d 84 (1942).
'8 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 359m-w.
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address given by him and withholds the registration for a thirty day
period after mailing to permit the obtaining of a restraining order. 9
This enactment permitted and in fact resulted in considerable relaxation
of New York issuers and transfer agents of the strict requirements of
New York issuers and transfer agents for documentation to attest to the
rightfulness of transfer, but it does not go beyond the defined fiduciary
situations.
Thus in New York a considerable area of the coverage of article 8
had been the subject of pre-Code legislation. Nonetheless in the writer's
view the article adds considerably in substance as well as clarity to the
law of investment securities in our state. Section by section analysis
would serve no useful purpose but it should be worthwhile to point up
some highlights, and incidentally to note some changes made in the
uniform text of the article by the Legislature at the suggestion of the
New York Commissioners on Uniform State Laws who in turn proposed
them "to meet criticisms of the 1958 Official Text stated in the Report
of the New York [City] Clearing House Association dated December 1,
1961.2)20
In the writer's view several of these "New York Amendments" to
article 8 are particularly badly drawn, ill advised from a policy stand-
point, or both. Along with other nonuniform amendments adopted or
proposed in other states which have enacted or are currently considering
enactment of the Code, they were reviewed this Fall by the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Sponsors of the Code.2 Comment as to some of
the areas dealt with by the New York Amendments and related action
taken by the Permanent Editorial Board appears seriatim in the follow-
ing discussion.
DEFINITIONS
The definition of "Security" in article 8 covers both money and non-
money paper ["evidences a share, participation or other interest in prop-
19 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 359q(a),(b).
20 The quotation is from the Letter of Transmittal of the Supplementary Report of the
New York Comm'n to the Legislature dated January 24, 1962 (herein cited as "Supple-
mentary Report"). In two instances the changes were suggested by counsel for the N.Y.
Stock Exch. As to these New York Amendments see generally Penney, "New York Revisits
the Code, Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 998-1000, 1007-13.
21 The American Law Inst. and the Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws.
New York is represented on the Board by Professor John W. MacDonald, Chairman of the
New York Law Revision Commission. Board action takes the form of adopting or rejecting
a proposed amendment to the uniform text. In a few instances (for examples see the discus-
sion of §§ 1-201(27) and 8-107 infra) the Board itself has drafted amendments in areas
of policy suggested by proposed amendments the specific texts of which appear to the Board
inadequate to solve the problems sought to be dealt with.
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erty or in an enterprise .. .or . ..an obligation of the issuer"] and
it is basically functional ["of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized . . . as a medium for
investment."] 22
It may be noted that it is entirely possible for the organizers of a
business enterprise even in corporate form to create investment media
which will not fit the definition, e.g., by the use of instruments in order
form, or stating the name of the owner without provision for registration
of transfer, and for the noncorporate business entity such as a limited
partnership to finance itself and function without issuing securities at all.
Nonetheless the obligations of or interests in these enterprises (even
though not embodied in a specific "instrument") will be "investment
contracts" and thus "securities" for regulatory purposes under the Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933 and State Blue Sky Laws.2"
There are "legal investment" statutes in some jurisdictions requiring
that securities purchased be "negotiable instruments." Since article 8
removes bearer bonds (probably the most prolific type of legal invest-
ment) from the Uniform NIL definition, it was thought best to include
a specific statutory declaration that "securities governed by this article
are negotiable instruments." A New York amendment adds "and are
fungible. ' 24 The addition seems to the writer clearly an overstatement.25
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE; ISSUER'S DEFENSES
Article 8 clarifies the situation as to incorporation of additional terms
by reference to extrinsic documents (e.g., a constitution, a statute, regu-
latory orders, a mortgage or trust indenture or the like), sanctioning
the practice "to the extent that the terms so referred to do not conflict
with the stated terms"; 26 and it extends to all types of securities the
long-standing NIL rule that all defenses of the issuer except lack of
genuineness of the security "are ineffective against a purchaser for value
who has taken without notice of the particular defense. 2s7
22 Section 8-102(1),(a).
23 See, e.g., SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and cases cited therein;
SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See generally 1 Loss, Securities Regulation
(2d ed. 1962).
24 Section 8-105. But see, N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-105(1), N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962 ch. 553, eff.
Sept. 27, 1964.
25 See text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
26 Section 8-202(1). Cf. Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928); N.Y.
Stock Corp. Law § 65 and the new N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 508(b) (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961
ch. 885, now eff. Sept. 1, 1963). The "fine line" [Penney, supra note 20, at 995] between
Enoch and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 247 N.Y. 538, 161 N.E. 173 (1928), thus
fortunately becomes academic.
27 Section 8-202(4).
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PROCEDURES ON ISSUANCE
In the field of commercial paper the principle of caveat emptor gener-
ally has been considered applicable. Not so as to securities. The cases
have applied strict rules, e.g., estopping the issuer to question the binding
effect of a corporate signature placed on the security by any employee
who could be shown to have had any reasonable semblance of authority
to issue.2 s
Purchasers of securities (particularly investment bankers) are accus-
tomed to require of the issuer strict proof of validity and the classic
opinion of counsel to the effect that the securities "are duly issued and
outstanding"; that debt securities "are the valid and subsisting obli-
gations of the issuer in accordance with their terms"; and that shares
of stock are "fully paid and nonassessable."
Moreover the indenture trustee authenticating bonds or debentures
and the transfer agents and registrars issuing stock certificates have histori-
cally been held responsible at least for genuineness and proper form of
the security29 and for the prevention of overissue;30 and the registration
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 are so phrased that action of
an indenture trustee, transfer agent or registrar in causing transmission
of unregistered securities in interstate commerce may violate the Act.3'
Against this background counsel for indenture trustees and transfer
agents are accustomed to make an independent check.-2 One of the
New York amendments would substantially cut down the responsibilities
assumed by trustees, transfer agents and the like under the case law by
omitting from section 8-102 the definition of "proper form" and amend-
ing section 8-208(1) (a) to require certification not as in the Uniform
text "that (a) the security is genuine and in proper form"; but merely
that it is genuine and "in the form which such person has been authorized
to authenticate, sign or countersign."
In the 1952 official draft of the Code the obligation of the authenticat-
ing trustee, registrar or transfer agent with respect to overissue was
28 Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 (1922);
Knox v. Eden Musee Americain Co., 148 N.Y. 441, 42 N.E. 988 (1896). Article 8 codifies
if not extends the doctrine by giving full effect to signature by an employee "entrusted
with the responsible handling of the security." § 8-205.
29 Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68 (1896); Fifth Ave. Bank v.
42d Street & Grand St. Ferry R.R., 137 N.Y. 231, 240, 33 N.E. 378, 380 (1893).
30 Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Natl Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
31 Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly-...
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce
... any such security... for delivery after sale.
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(2), 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(2) (1959).
32 This includes a careful review of the opinion of counsel for the issuer as to registration,
or as to the availability of an exemption from -the registration requirements of the
Securities Act.
1962]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
limited to certification that the security is within the amount specified
in the authorization received from the issuer. 3 In recognition of the
confidence properly placed by the investing public in the banking insti-
tutions which serve as indenture trustees, transfer agents, etc., this lan-
guage was changed in 1956 to that which appears in the 1958 text, namely
a certification that the trustee or transfer agent "has reasonable grounds
to believe that the security is within the amount the issuer is authorized
to issue.13
4
The Permanent Editorial Board has determined that the scope of
the certification as to "proper form" should be similarly stated; spe-
cifically that since the definition of that term in section 8-102 serves no
purpose other than cross reference to section 8-208 it may well be omit-
ted, but that section 8-208(1)(c) should read "He has reasonable
grounds to believe that the security is in tke form and within the amount
the issuer is authorized to issue." Thus the obligation to make inde-
pendent check clearly will be preserved in terms of due care, and the
institution relieved of what might otherwise conceivably amount to the
liability of an insurer in these areas.
BONA FmnE PURCHASE; ADVERSE CLAIm
Article 8 defines "bona fide purchaser" as one who "for value in good
faith and without notice of any adverse claim . . . takes delivery of a
security in bearer form or of one in registered form issued to him or
indorsed to him or in blank. 3 5
The definition of "adverse claim" is comprehensive. It "includes a
claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular
adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security. . .. "I
Claims of either legal or equitable title are clearly covered, as are
claims of beneficial interest or that a transfer made or contemplated
would be in violation of a valid restriction such as one imposed by a
certificate of incorporation or a by-law, by an agreement among stock-
holders or otherwise by the issuer, e.g., to guard against possible violation
of the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 by purchasers
of its securities "for investment.' 3 7
33 UCC Official Draft, Text and Comments Ed. 1952, §§ 8-208(1) (b) and (c).
34 1958 Official Text § 8-208(1)(c).
35 Section 8-302. The classic NIL term "holder in due course" is discarded. The bona
fide purchaser "acquires the security free of any adverse claim," § 8-301(2). Under appro-
priate conditions one not a bona fide purchaser in his own right may none the less (as
under NIL § 58) be "sheltered" and entitled to the benefits of that status. § 8-301(1), and
see Gruntal v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930).
36 Section 8-301(1).
37 Section 8-204 carries over the rule of the USTA that a restriction on transfer imposed
by the issuer is ineffective unless conspicuously noted on the certificate. There is an excep-
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A New York amendment adds to the definition "and in the case of a
purchase of a limited interest includes only a claim adverse to the in-
terest purchased." In support the Supplementary Report urges that
there are situations in which there is a valid transfer of ownership of a
number of shares of stock less than the total represented by a particular
certificate.38 Article 8 therefore specifically negates the NIL Rule that
"the indorsement must be . . . of the entire instrument" 39 substituting
"an indorsement purporting to be only of part of a security representing
units intended by the issuer to be separately transferable is effective to
the extent of the indorsement. '40
Under section 8-301(3), a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. If A acquires a fifty
per cent interest and B a fifty per cent interest, each interest is so limited
that neither conflicts with the other. Moreover, since the adverse claim-
ant must be "a particular adverse person" (emphasis added), a claim to
any complementary interest, e.g., a noncompeting fifty per cent interest
or that of a remainderman as against a life tenant or a beneficiary as
against a trustee is not "adverse" and does not produce an adverse claim.
The term itself connotes adversity. Necessarily in the case of a purchase
of a limited interest such adversity must be to the specific limited
interest acquired. On this basis, the Permanent Editorial Board has
rejected this Amendment and it will not be included in the text of the
Uniform Code.
EFFECT OF "MATURITY"; "STALENESS"
Article 8 rejects as to the bona fide purchaser of securities the NIL
requirement that the instrument be acquired "before it was overdue."41
The overdue bond (whether or not the obligor has defaulted) or the
stock issue called for redemption, or for exchange in course of a merger
or consolidation, may quite legitimately be traded on the market for a
considerable period of time after maturity or even after money or new
securities are available for payment or delivery.42
REPARATION IN KIND
Article 8 contemplates reparation in kind for one improperly deprived
of a security, e.g., by loss, theft, or transfer upon forged indorsement4 3
tion, particularly important in the securities regulation field, as to persons taking the se-
curity with "actual knowledge" of the restriction. See Israels, "Stop-Transfer Procedures
and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Article 8," 17 Rutgers L. Rev. - (1962).
38 Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at p. 15.
39 NIL § 32.
40 Section 8-308(g).
41 NIL § 52(2). Cf. the concomitant N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law provision in § 261(4).
42 See § 8-203 as to notice of issuer's defenses, and § 8-305 as to notice of adverse claims.
43 Section 8-315. Cf. Prince v. Childs Co., 23 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1928).
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subject only to the limitations necessarily imposed by the time honored
concept that "overissue" of corporate shares is "absolutely void. '44
Even where overissue is involved, article 8 requires that the security
be replaced in kind in any case where "an identical security which does
not constitute an overissue is reasonably available for purchase," and
only where such a purchase cannot be made does it relegate the claimant
to a suit for damages.45
INDORSEMENT
Article 8 lays the ghost of secondary liability on the part of the indorser
of a security, specifically providing that "Unless otherwise agreed the in-
dorser by his indorsement assumes no obligation that the security will be
honored by the issuer."46 It defines the "appropriate person" to indorse a
registered form security and makes clear distinction between power to
indorse and power to deliver-and thus complete a transfer-by provid-
ing that (i) "Whether the person signing is appropriate is determined
as of the date of signing and an indorsement by such a person does not
become unauthorized... by virtue of any subsequent change of circum-
stances"; and (ii) failure of a fiduciary to comply with a controlling
instrument or with state law, including any law requiring him to obtain
a court approval of a transfer "does not render his indorsement un-
authorized for purposes of this Article. 1 7 Thus a security indorsed by
a decedent, by a duly authorized agent or by a fiduciary may be validy
delivered though death or other termination of authority or of relation-
ship has intervened. More important, where, for example, a court order
is required to validate a "transfer," "sale" or "disposition" of securities,
that requirement is a restriction not upon power to indorse, but upon the
propriety or rightfulness of the delivery.
On the other hand, signature by any person other than the registered
owner (e.g., an agent or a corporate officer) after termination of his
tenure as such is "unauthorized" and ineffective as part of a valid
transfer. The issuer who registers the transfer in such a case is liable
44 Section 8-104. The 1865 decision in New York & N.H. R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30
(1865) is still the leading case.
45 Section 8-104(1) (2). Damages recoverable are fixed at the price which the plaintiff
or the last purchaser for value paid for the security, with interest from the date of demand.
What the pre-Code New York law would be in such situation is not clear under the cases.
E.g., Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 347 (N.Y. Ct. of Err. 1839); Baker v. Drake,
53 N.Y. 211 (1873) and see Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N.Y. 442, 446, 117 N.E. 948, 949 (1917).
46 Section 8-308(4).
47 Sections 8-308(6) and (7). The term "unauthorized signature" includes "forgery" and
has the classic consequences of a forged indorsement, except that the security can no longer
be recovered from "a purchaser for value and without notice of adverse claims who has
in good faith received a new, reissued or re-registered security on registration of transfer."
§§ 8-311, 8-404.
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for improper registration as he would be in a case of outright forgery"
but has full recourse to the guarantor of signature who has specifically
warranted that "at the time of signing (a) the signature was genuine;
and (b) the signer was an appropriate person to indorse; and (c) the
signer had legal capacity to sign."1
49
Where the question is the propriety of the delivery, whether the pur-
chaser can obtain bona fide status and whether the issuer may properly
register transfer are dependent upon whether they have or are chargeable
with "notice" of the particular adverse claim which is sought to be
enforced. Nor is there in such case recourse to the guarantor of signature
who "does not otherwise warrant the rightfulness of the particular
transfer."5 (Emphasis added.)
WARRANTIEos O TANsER
Related to the concept of secondary liability of the indorser are the
warranties made by transferor to transferee. Under article 8 warranties
are made only to a purchaser for value and their scope is strictly limited:
the transferor warrants the genuineness of the security; that his transfer
of it is effective and rightful and that he knows of no fact which might
impair the validity of the security.5
Where the transferor is an "intermediary" he "warrants only his own
good faith and authority," but a broker "is not an intermediary within
the meaning of this subsection." 52 There has been some semantic diffi-
culty as to whether or not a securities dealer generally, or an institution
such as a bank, which by reason of the function it sometimes performs
in other securities transactions may fall within the Code definition of
"broker, M 3 can qualify for the protection given to an "intermediary"
48 Sections 8-311, 8-404.
49 Section 8-312(1). One case that may be considered an exception to this rule is that
of the removed or resigned fiduciary in whose name as such the security was registered.
As to such a registered owner the issuer may assume continuing tenure of office until it
receives "written notice that the fiduciary is no longer acting as such with respect to the
particular security," § 8-403(3) (a). Thus the signature of the removed or resigned fiduciary
never becomes "unauthorized" so long as he remains the registered owner of the security
and thus (like a thief) possibly still in a position to convey to a bona fide purchaser title to
the security free of any adverse claim. The treatment of this case may work a change in
substantive law. For example, Christy, The Transfer of Stock § 342 (3d ed. 1960) cites
the signature of a resigned or removed trustee as an example of one which is "unauthor-
ized." On the other hand the only case in the books which the writer has been able to find
was decided in Mississippi in 1890. Mobile & 0. Ry. v. Humphries, 7 So. 522 (Sup. Ct.
Miss. 1890). The decision is not particularly helpful since it held the issuer, but not the
purchaser, liable where neither had notice of the removal.
50 Section 8-312(1).
51 Section 8-306(2).
52 Section 8-306(3).
53 Section 8-303. "Broker" means a person engaged for all or part of his time in the
business of buying and selling securities, who in the transaction concerned acts for,
or buys a security from or sells a security to a customer. Nothing in this Article deter-
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where in the particular transaction he does not function as a broker.
It was intended that he should be able so to qualify, in line with the decision
of a New York case which arose under a similar section of the USTA.'
In Appenzellar v. McCall,54 a brokerage firm held as collateral for ad-
vances to its customer stock certificates which the customer had forged.
At his instructions they delivered the collateral to another broker who
paid off the debit balance and upon discovering the forgery sued for
breach of warranty of genuineness. The court held that the firm had
not in this instance functioned as a "broker" in a "sale" transaction but
merely as an intermediary and had not, therefore, made the warranty.
A New York amendment attempts to clarify this situation by revising
the last sentence of section 8-306(3) to read "A broker acting as a
broker in a particular transaction is not an intermediary within the mean-
ing of this subsection." The Permanent Editorial Board determined to
delete the sentence altogether. The writer is confident that with the
Appenzellar decision on the books and the Code definition of "broker"
phrased in terms of "the transaction concerned," the courts can be trusted
to reach the appropriate results on a case by case basis.
DELIVERY
To begin with the various commercial practices which permit a trans-
feror to make delivery by doing something less than placing the security
physically in the possession of the transferee are recognized in article 0.5
Where no broker is involved the risk of loss in transit falls (unless
otherwise agreed) on the transferor, not the transferee.56
Where brokers are involved the transferor fulfills his obligation by
making delivery to his broker. The selling broker fulfills his obligation
by delivering the specific security "or a like security" to the buying
broker either physically or through the clearing processes of an
organized market;57 and the buying broker makes delivery to his cus-
tomer either physically or by holding for him an instrument which by
the form of its registration or "by book entry or otherwise" is specifically
identified as belonging to the customer.5"
mines the capacity in which a person acts for purposes of any other statute or rule
to which such person is subject.
54 150 Misc. 897, 270 N.Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 1934). Cf. Gruntal v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930) codified in § 8-318
under which full protection is given to "[ajn agent or bailee" acting in good faith on the
instructions of a principal though the latter had no right to dispose of the securities.
55 Sections 8-313 and 8-314 provide for delivery to a person "designated by" the transferee
or by someone in possession of the security to acknowledge to the transferee that the secur-
ity is held for him, and cf. § 8-320 added by New York Amendment and discussed infra.
56 Section 8-314(2).
57 Sections 8-314(1)(b), 8-320.
58 Section 8-313(1).
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With respect to deliveries as between brokers certain of the New York
amendments have important and useful impact. As enacted in New York
section 8-102(3) defines a "Clearing Corporation," 59 section 8-102(4)
defines a "Custodian Bank," 60 and section 8-320 relates to "Transfer or
Pledge within a Central Depositary System." The two definitions are
almost self explanatory and the writer would at most criticise the require-
ment that a "Clearing Corporation" must have all of its capital stock
held by a national securities exchange registered as such under Federal
statute. The Permanent Editorial Board has determined that the defi-
nition should be broadened to include a "Clearing Corporation" whose
stock is held by an association of securities dealers registered as such
under Federal statute so that the benefits of the procedure will be avail-
able in the over the counter market if desired.
Subsection 8-320(1) states the requirements for "transfer by book
entry" in terms of possession of the affected security (in bearer form or
appropriately indorsed) by a clearing corporation, a custodian bank, or
the nominee of either; and subsection (2) contemplates the employment
of "balance" certificates, e.g. by custodian banks which function as
transfer agents for the particular issue. The key provision is that of
subsection (3) which gives the procedures authorized in subsections (1)
and (2) "the effect of a delivery of a security in bearer form or duly
indorsed in blank." 61 Subsection (4) makes it clear that transfer or
pledge under Section 8-320 does not of itself work any change in the
registered ownership of the affected security, and subsection (5) states
the accountability of a clearing corporation to persons adversely af-
fected by entries made on its books which "are not appropriate."
In view of this language it would seem that a New York amendment
which was added to section 8-302 becomes pure surplusage. Uniform
section 8-302 defines a bona fide purchaser in terms of one "who takes
delivery of a security in bearer form or of one in registered form issued
to him or indorsed to him or in blank." The New York amendment adds
"or who takes delivery in a manner specified in section 8-320." In other
words (with due apology to Gertrude Stein), "A delivery is a delivery
is a delivery." The Permanent Editorial Board agreed and has rejected
this amendment.
59 Section 8-102(3) reads:
A "clearing corporation" is a corporation, all of the capital stock of which is held
by or for a national securities exchange registered under a statute of the United States
such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
60 Section 8-102(4) reads:
A "custodian bank" is any bank or trust company which is supervised and examined
by state or federal authority having supervision over banks and which is acting as
custodian for a clearing corporation.
61 The conclusion is confirmed by the Board's addition of subsection (1) (e) to § 8-313,
in effect merely a cross-reference to 8-320.
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Special problems are presented in the margin account situation. The
buying broker having advanced a substantial percentage of the purchase
price of the security takes delivery in "Street name,"62 placing it in a
safe deposit box or pledging it with the bank from which he is currently
borrowing as "part of a fungible bulk held for customers""3 and expecting
to honor his obligation to deliver only when the customer's indebtedness
has been discharged-usually out of the proceeds of a later sale of the
security. Historically it has been said that there are two "rules" as to
property rights in such a situation; that under the so-called "New York"
or majority rule the customer has "title" while the broker is a pledgee
or lienholder; that under the "Massachusetts" rule the relationship is
that of debtor and creditor, with "title" vesting in the broker.6 Gener-
ally the Code does not deal with who may or who may not have "title"; 6 5
but with who is or who is not a "holder," i.e., the person in possession
of the instrument who may or who may not have title, and with the sta-
tus of the holder as a "purchaser" and in a proper case a "bona fide
purchaser.""6 Consistent with this approach, Uniform section 8-313(2)
states that in the margin account case the customer "is not the holder"
of the security despite his "acquisition of a proportionate property in-
terest in the fungible bulk." The important intended legal consequence
is made clear in the Comment to the section.
Should a customer . . . receive notice of a defect in the security prior
to ... specific identification ... he cannot become a bona fide purchaser.
Therefore he is of course entitled to refuse to accept delivery of such a
security from the broker.
With respect to this subsection the Supplementary Report states that:7
Concern has been expressed . . . [as to] the position of a buyer of
securities as part of a fungible bulk as against adverse claimants and cred-
itors of a broker, including a broker's trustee in bankruptcy, and the
United States as a claimant under a Federal tax lien.
There was a danger that if a broker who purchased a security in good
faith for the account of a customer received "notice" before "delivery"
to the customer he would not be able to make good delivery to the cus-
62 I.e., his own name, or that of another broker or a bank nominee partnership. It is
of course widely customary for securities so registered and indorsed in blank to circulate
freely in the organized securities markets where the essential signatures are easily verified.
63 Section 8-313(3). In such form securities do fit the definition of "fungible" in
§ 1-201(17); see the discussion at p. 122, infra.
64 Strickland v. Magoun, 119 App. Div. 113, 104 N.Y. Supp. 425 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 190
N.Y. 545, 83 N.E. 1132 (1907). Whether there really ever was a "Massachusetts" rule is
somewhat doubtful. See Denton v. Gurnett & Co., 69 F.2d 750 (1st Cir. 1934).
65 It has been colloquially observed that not even in article 2 (Sales) does the UCC
play the ancient game of "Title, title, who's got the title?"
66 "Holder" is defined in terms of possession only in § 1-201(20). "Purchase" and "pur-
chaser" are defined in §§ 1-201(32) and (33), and bona fide purchaser as to securities in
§ 8-302.
67 Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at pp. 17-18.
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tomer and would have to suffer any loss resulting from a decline in the
value of the securities in whose purchase he was merely carrying out the
orders of the customer.
Consistent with these views, two New York amendments restate sub-
section 8-313(2) and add subsection (3) as follows:
(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him by his broker,
but is not the holder except as specified in subsections (b) and (c) of
subsection (1). Where a security is part of a fungible bulk, the purchaser
is the owner of a proportionate property interest in the fungible bulk
and is a bona fide purchaser if when the broker takes delivery as a
holder neither he nor the purchaser has notice of any adverse claim and
the purchaser takes his interest for value.
(3) Notice of an adverse claim to the broker or to the purchaser
after the broker takes delivery as a holder without notice of any adverse
claim is not notice of the adverse claim to either the broker or the pur-
chaser.
The language of the amendments is to say the least confusing and the
tautology of New York subsection (3) that "Notice . . . is not notice"
seems peculiarly inept. Concededly the text should, to the fullest possible
extent, protect the position of the margin customer in a brokerage bank-
ruptcy, but that there should be legitimate "concern" in that area seems
to the writer a bit far-fetched.6
To the extent that the New York amendments attempt to put a buying
broker in a position to pass on to his customer even the burden of defend-
ing against a completely groundless adverse claim, it seems completely
indefensible. One of the things for which the customer pays his broker
is the broker's expertise in obtaining a completely "clean" security.
What is more the broker (as distinguished from the customer) is entitled
to the benefit of the rules of the organized markets with respect to
"Reclamations" under which any security as to which notice of an adverse
claim is received "may be returned to the party who introduced it into
the market."0 9 Endeavor to reconcile these points of view led the Per-
manent Editorial Board to adopt new text for sections 8-313(2) and
(3) designed to allay any legitimate fears with respect to the property
rights of the purchaser in the fungible bulk, and to make completely
clear the right of the purchaser as against his broker to demand delivery
of an unquestionably "clean" security. The text of the subsections is
revised as follows:
68 See, e.g., Denton v. Gurnett & Co., supra note 64 and in the Matter of Mills, 125
App. Div. 130, 110 N.Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't 1908). Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 60(e), 52
Stat. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(e) (1958) and the writer's discussion of the problem in
the context of an earlier text of article 8 in 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249, 258-60 (1951).
69 See Rules of the Board of Governors of the N.Y. Stock Exch., "Reclamation" Rules
224-34, inclusive. The quotation is from Rule 231.
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(2) The purchaser is the owner of a security held for him by his broker,
but is not the holder except as specified in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of
subsection (1). Where a security is part of a fungible bulk the purchaser
is the owner of a proportionate property interest in the fungible bulk.
(3) Notice of an adverse claim received by the broker or by the pur-
chaser after the broker takes delivery as a holder for value is not effective
either as to the broker or as to the purchaser. However, as between the
broker and the purchaser the purchaser may demand delivery of an equiv-
alent security as to which no notice of an adverse claim has been received.
As we have noted, one of the New York amendments is the inclusion
in section 8-105 of a statutory declaration that all securities "are fun-
gible." The term "fungible" is defined in section 1-201(17) to include
"securities of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade the equiva-
lent of any other like unit." Of course by either standard the rights
and interests represented by each share of the common stock of United
States Steel Corporation are the exact equivalent of those represented
by every other such share. Not so as to the certificates which represent
those shares. A security to begin with must be an "instrument"7" and
if it appears from the face of that instrument that it is registered in the
name of John Doe, that instrument at least until indorsed by John Doe
is not, either by nature or by usage of trade the equivalent of a certifi-
cate in the name of Richard Roe which Richard Roe has indorsed in
blank, having his signature guaranteed by his bank or broker. The
latter is in form to constitute "a delivery" under the Rules of the New
York Stock Exchange; the former is not. If perchance, Richard Roe
were designated as a trustee or the registration were in the name of
Richard Roe, Inc., even the indorsement and guarantee of signature
would not bring the certificate in question into the category of "delivery"
as defined by the rules and practice of the organized markets.7 1
Another New York amendment related to problems of delivery deals
with the right of the seller of securities to sue his buyer for the price.
As enacted in New York section 8-107 provides:
Where, pursuant to a contract to sell or a sale, a security has been
delivered or tendered to the purchaser, and the purchaser wrongfully
fails to pay for the security according to the terms of the contract or the
sale, the seller may in addition to any other remedy recover the agreed
price of the security. This provision does not affect the remedy of a seller
if the security has not been delivered or tendered.
70 Section 8-102 (1) (a).
71 See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch. Rules 186-214, et seq, respecting "Assignments." The rules
are expressed in terms of what "shall be a delivery." For example it is specifically provided
that a certificate bearing an assignment by a decedent, a trustee or other fiduciary, agent
or attorney "shall not be a delivery." Rule 201.
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The stated purpose was
to insure the continuance of the rule in Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248,
190 N.E. 479 (1934). The holding of that case was that where the buyer
had refused to accept delivery of a security the seller ...is limited to
an action for damages. The dictum of that case was that where delivery
of a security has been completed the seller may ...recover the price.72
The most cursory examination of the text of New York's section 8-107
clearly indicates the variance. That text purports to give an action for
the price not only where delivery has been completed but where it has
been merely "tendered" and thus to overrule the holding of the Agar case.
The policy is surely unwise unless clearly limited to securities for which
there is no ready market.
To indicate forcefully the nature of the obligation of any transferor
of securities to make delivery and to define properly the situation in which
an action for the price will lie, the following revised text of section 8-107
has been adopted by the Permanent Editorial Board:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, and subject to any applicable law or
regulation respecting short sales, a person obligated to deliver securities
may deliver any security of the specified issue, in bearer form, or registered
in the name of the transferee, or indorsed to him or in blank.
(2) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it comes due under a
contract of sale the seller may recover the price
(a) of securities accepted by the buyer; and
(b) of other securities if efforts at their resale would be unduly burden-
some or if there is no readily available market for their resale.
Subsection (1) does the job intended by the epithetical phrase "and
are fungible" included in the New York Amendment to section 8-105
which was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board. Only to the extent
that securities are available in form to be further transferred by the person
to whom they are deliverable, are they properly treated as fungible.
This is the concept generally accepted in the organized markets. "Unless
otherwise agreed," the seller, bailee (including a broker acting as agent)
or other "person obligated to deliver securities" need not deliver any
specific instrument, but may select (e.g., from a "fungible bulk"73 ) any
security of the proper issue, in bearer form or appropriately registered.
The rules of the organized markets limiting the forms of registration in
which securities are deliverable in transactions on such markets are
matters "otherwise agreed," and the proviso respecting short sales has
reference as well to statutory and administrative regulation of such
markets. Cases74 holding a solvent broker liable for conversion if he
72 Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at p. 14.
73 Section 8-313(2).
74 Such as Parsons v. Martin, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 111 (1858); Rumery v. Brooks, 205
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registers transfer of a customer's securities held in "cash account" out
of the customer's name or tenders on demand for delivery a different
though equivalent security are rejected. However, the Section does not
enlarge the rights of the broker as to such securities so as to permit him
without the customer's consent to pledge them for his own indebtedness
as he may properly do with securities held in a margin account and upon
which he has acquired a lien for advances.75
Subsection (2) is designed roughly to equate the remedies available
against a defaulting buyer of securities (including the guarantor of a
loan who has given the lender a "put" in the form of his obligation to
purchase the securities upon demand) to those available to the seller of
goods under Section 2-709. Paragraph (b) is applicable where for
example (i) securities are those of a closely held corporation not dealt
in on any organized market; or (ii) because of the necessity for com-
pliance with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933
prior to offering the particular securities on the market, substantial delay
and expense would be involved.71
NOTICE
Both as to issuers77 and purchasers,78 article 8 specifically rejects the
case law with respect to the effect of knowledge of fiduciary ownership.
Part 4 of article 871 is a complete codification of the rights and obli-
gations of the issuer of registered form securities with respect to regis-
tration of transfer. It states the duty of the issuer to register on pre-
sentation in any case where (a) the indorsements are in order; and
(b) there is no duty to inquire into adverse claims or any such duty
which arose has been discharged."0
Conversely the same section clearly states the issuer's liability to the
App. Div. 283, 199 N.Y. Supp. 517 (1st Dep't 1923) and Thorner v. Webster, N.Y.LJ.
November 8, 1933 p. 1668 (City Court Special Term).
75 The distinction is carefully preserved in Statute (e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 956) and
case law. In the Matter of Mills, 125 App. Div. 730, 110 N.Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dep't 1908).
76 The Securities and Exchange Commission interprets the 1960 decision of the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819
(1960) as drastically limiting the rights of creditors holding "control stock" as collateral
security to liquidate the collateral without prior compliance with the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act. In such a situation the specific enforceability of the guarantor's
obligation to accept and pay for securities "put? to him is of major importance.
77 Section 8-403(3).
78 Section 8-304(2). For this purpose the category of "purchaser" includes the seller's
broker who ordinarily does not fall within it because when he takes in an agency capacity
he acquires no "interest in property." § 1-201(32).
79 Sections 8-401-8-406.
80 Section 8-401(1)(a)(b). These are the essential elements. The duty to collect transfer
or similar taxes is of course continued, and though not bound to inquire into the rightfulness
of the particular transaction an issuer sued for refusal to register a transfer may nonetheless
defend against anyone other than a bona fide purchaser on the ground that the transaction
was in fact unrightful. §§ 8-401(1) (c) (d).
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person presenting the security for registration for unreasonable delay
or improper failure or refusal to register.81
As under pre-Code law, the issuer remains absolutely liable for regis-
tration of transfer on an unauthorized signature. 2 Since that is the case
the issuer is entitled to demand "reasonable assurance" 83 "that each
necessary indorsement is genuine and effective. '84 Such assurance prop-
erly includes (a) a guarantee of signature by a responsible guarantor;
(b) where the signature is by an agent, evidence of authority to sign;
and (c) where the signature is by a fiduciary "appropriate evidence of
appointment or incumbency."85
With respect to evidence of authority to sign, article 8 in effect sanc-
tions the standard commercial practice of requiring the production of
documents such as powers of attorney or, with respect to a corporate
officer, a certified resolution of the board of directors. Such documenta-
tion should of course have been obtained in the first instance by the
guarantor of signature who will be liable to the issuer if by any chance
the security was indorsed without authority or after termination of
authority 86
Permitting the issuer to require such evidence was perhaps a slight
concession to fears of the irresponsibility of local banks and securities
dealers as guarantors of signature. Such documentation, however, is
usually easily obtained, and even the requirement that it be submitted
once to the guarantor and again to the issuer should not be overly burden-
some. In the case of the fiduciary the requirement is easily met by the
usual "short form certificate" dated within sixty days of presentation,
or where the fiduciary is not court-appointed, by a document, certificate
or other evidence "reasonably deemed by the issuer to be appropriate." 87
In a sense the sixty day requirement gives assurance merely "that the
grass still grows green," because as to a security'registered in fiduciary
name the issuer is entitled to assume continuing tenure of office until
notified in writing of its termination."
Nothing in article 8 specifically limits the issuer's requirements to the
81 Section 8-401(2).
82 Sections 8-311, 8-404. Also as under pre-Code law, the owner may have ratified or
become "otherwise precluded" from asserting the ineffectiveness of the signature, e.g., as
by failure to notify the issuer of loss or theft within a reasonable time after discovery of it.
§ 8-405(1).
83 Section 8-401(1)(b).
8 Section 8-402(1).
85 Section 8-402(1) (a) (b) (c).
86 The guarantor of signature warrants the authority of the signer "at the time of
signing" "to any person taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the guarantee."
§ 8-312(1) and (3).
87 Sections 8-402(1) (c), (3)(a)(b).
88 Section 8-403(3)(a).
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items noted, all of which are listed in section 8-402(1) (2) and (3); but
section 8-402(4) is a sort of in terrorem rule which should have the
same effect. It permits the requirement of further "reasonable assurance",
but provides that if, for any purpose other than checking appointment
or incumbency of a fiduciary, the issuer "requires and obtains a copy of
a will, trust, indenture, articles of co-partnership, by-laws, or other con-
trolling instrument, it is charged with notice of all matters contained
therein affecting the transfer."
An issuer's duty to inquire into adverse claims arises under article 8
only from (1) a sufficient written notification of the claim received in
due time;89 or (2) its own requirements and receipt of what might be
termed "excess documentation."9 °
There are specific provisions overruling prior case law and relieving
the issuer in any situation other than one of the two just listed from any
duty to inquire as to compliance with a controlling instrument or with
state law (including any requirement of court order to validate delivery
of the security) or as to any court record or other document even though
the transfer being registered is on the indorsement of a fiduciary to
himself or to his nominee.
Nevertheless, once a duty of inquiry has arisen, that duty must be
discharged "by any reasonable means" specifically including a thirty day
notice by registered or certified mail to the claimant that a transfer will
be registered at the end of the period unless either an appropriate re-
straining order is obtained or a sufficient indemnity bond furnished.
On the other side of the coin, article 8 states the liability of the issuer
for improper, registration limited to a case where (a) transfer was regis-
tered on an unauthorized signature; or (b) a duty to inquire into adverse
claims arose and was not properly discharged prior to the registration.9
Finally section 8-406 provides that the transfer agent, registrar, or
similar agent of the issuer, with respect to the functions it performs,
stands in the shoes of the issuer as accountable to the holders of the
securities, and specifically that notice to the agent is notice to the issuer
"with respect to the functions performed by the agent.
92
As to purchasers it is specifically provided that knowledge of fiduciary
ownership
does not create a duty of inquiry into the rightfulness of the transfer nor
constitute notice of adverse claims .... [unless there is] knowledge that
89 Section 8-403(1) (a). Such notification is colloquially referred to as a "stop transfer
notice." It must identify the claimant, the registered owner of the security and the issue of
which it is a part, and provide an address for communications directed to the claimant.
90 Section 8-403(1)(b).
91 Section 8-404.
92 Section 8-406(2).
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the proceeds are being used or that the transaction is for the individual
benefit of the fiduciary or otherwise in breach of duty....93
The use of the word "knowledge" is particularly important in this
context under the Code definition of "Notice" contained in section
1-201(25):
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time
in question he has reason to know that it exists.
The distinction between the case where there is "knowledge" of the
ultimate fact and that where by reason'of knowledge of evidentiary facts
there is "reason to know" the ultimate fact, is basic and important.
Thus, the knowledge that the proceeds of the transaction are being paid
to a fiduciary individually does not charge the purchaser with notice
of potential breach of trust by misuse of those proceeds, but knowledge
that the proceeds were being applied in payment of a personal debt9 4
would be another matter.
Surprisingly, one of the New York amendments incorporates a return
to the classic NIL "good faith" language. Uniform section 8-304
[Notice to Purchaser of Adverse Claims] has two subsections. New
York has added an additional subsection as to which the Supplementary
Report states: "The first sentence . . . carries forward the present lan-
guage of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 56, NYNIL
§ 95, and the standards which the New York courts have followed
in determining the qualification of a holder in due course." 95
Probably there has been no more prolific source of litigation in the
field of negotiable instruments than the boundaries of the "good faith"
rule.
The law may be regarded as settled, that a purchaser, for value advanced,
of negotiable paper, including bonds, is not bound to exercise such care
and caution as wary, prudent men would exercise. Negligence will not
impair his title. It is a question simply of good faith in the purchaser.
Unless the evidence makes out a case upon which a jury would be au-
thorized to find fraud or bad faith in a purchaser, it is the duty of the
court to direct a verdict.96
93 Section 8-304(2).
94 Section 8-304(2). Cf. State Bank v. Bache, 162 Misc. 128, 293 N.Y. Supp. 667 (Sup. Ct.
Broome County 1937).
95 Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at p. 16.
96 Welch v. Sage, 47 N.Y. 143, 146-47 (1872); Accord, Cheever v. Pittsburgh S. & L. E.
R.R., 150 N.Y. 59, 4 N.E. 701 (1896). "The requirement of the statute is good faith, and
bad faith is not mere carelessness. It is nothing less than guilty knowledge or willful
ignorance" Thacher, J., in Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N.Y. 226,
229, 72 N.E.2d, 166, 168 (1947).
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On the other hand it has been held that "gross carelessness" will
impair holder in due course status,97 and the courts, construing similar
"good faith" language of sections 3 and 4 of the Uniform Fiduciary Act,
substantially ignored their exonerative provisions." It is probably fair
to state that it has not been possible for some years in New York for a
bank, brokerage house or other relatively sophisticated purchaser suc-
cessfully to defend its holder in due course status merely on the ground
that, unfortunately for the claimant, the clerk who accepted the instru-
ment ignoring facts at hand acted "with pure heart, though empty head."
In effect our courts under the "good faith" language of the NIL have
simply created a standard of "good faith" applicable to such purchasers
higher than that applicable to a housewife or a farmer, or perhaps even
an ordinary businessman. 99
Against this background, the Code's intentional abandonment of the
"good faith" language was clearly sound. Nor would its reinstatement
help the banking institutions with their more serious problem-that of
when and how notice to the institution as such shall become effective.
In this area the law has never been particularly clear. The Code attempts
a solution in section 1-201(27):
(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organ-
ization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is
brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time when it would have been brought to his
attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.100
97 Canajoharie Natl Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N.Y. 191, 25 N.E. 402 (1890).
98 See the cases cited note 17 supra.
99 See, e.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Goetz, 285 N.Y. 74, 78, 32 N.E.2d 798(1941) citing failure of the defendant brokerage house
to use the standard of care prescribed by the rules of the stock exchange for brokers
dealing with a new account . . . [and] ... their failure to observe that some of the
serial numbers forged upon the bonds were unusually high for such issues ... [as] some
evidence of the standard of care that should be maintained by persons dealing in
securities belonging to others
and raising a question for decision by jury. Cf. Kittridge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155
N.E. 88 (1926), Morris v. Muir, 111 Misc. 739, 181 N.Y. Supp. 913 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct.
1920), and the opinion of Judge Foster in First Nat'l Bank v. Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 400,
179 N.E.2d 493, 496-97, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483, 488 (1961); 47 Cornell L.Q. 670 (1962):
A lapse of memory is too easily pleaded and too difficult to controvert to permit the
doctrine (of 'forgotten notice'] to be applied automatically irrespective of the circum-
stances surrounding each transaction and the relationship of the parties. . . . The
defendant was practically assured that his notice would be honored and the the note
would not be discounted by the plaintiff bank. Under such circumstances the bank
should be precluded from invoking the doctrine of 'forgotten notice.'
100 One of the few reported cases on the point, Wiese v. Corn Exch. Bank Trust Co., 240
App. Div. 198, 269 N.Y. Supp., 740 (1st Dep't 1934) seems consistent with this provision.
It refuses to charge the defendant bank with notice of the fact that bonds accepted as
collateral for a loan were stolen though other branches of the bank (not the main office)
had received a circular offering a reward for the bonds.
The "forgotten notice" cases sometimes also involve failure of communication within an
organization. The leading case of course is Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27
(1935), generally cited for the proposition that the mere fact that notice received by an
organization was "forgotten" does not impugn "good faith" or the organization's status as
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The second sentence of section 8-304(3) as enacted in New York at-
tempts to interpret this by providing that:
If the purchaser is an organization and maintains within the organi-
zation reasonable routines for communicating significant information to
the appropriate part of the organization apparently concerned, the indi-
vidual conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser must have
the knowledge.' 01
This seems to the writer a wholly unjustified protection of parochial
interest. What useful purpose does it serve to require that routines be
maintained unless failure to follow them clearly brings on the penalty
of liability? The writer does not believe the consequence is clear by
any means, the argument of the New York Commissioners0 2 to the con-
trary notwithstanding. On the other hand he does concur that Uniform
section 1-201(27) may be inadequate to the problem. The Permanent
Editorial Board worked out a clear solution. It rejected New York
sections 3-304(7) and 8-304(3) but expanded section 1-201(27) by
adding:
An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines
for communicating significant information to the person conducting the
transaction and others acting for the organization reasonably comply with
the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the
organization to communicate information unless such communication is
part of his regular duties or unless he has reason to know of the trans-
action and that the transaction would be materially affected by the
information.
Briefly, to summarize with respect to the "constructive notice" prob-
lem under article 8, the most important point is the distinctly different
treatment accorded the issuer and the purchaser of a security. The
"exoneration" of the issuer from any duty of inquiry with respect to
adverse claims is broadly stated and the exceptions to it are specific.
Thus, the policy sought to be implemented is that registration of transfer
shall no longer be impeded by the delay involved in reaching abstruse
determinations as to whether or not the particular facts at hand raise a
necessity for further inquiry. 0 3
a holder in due course. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Fazzari, supra note 99, where the court
refused to give the bank the benefit of the rules because the cashier who had "forgotten"
the notice had originally told the claimant "not to worry."
The Code does not affect the incidence of the "forgotten notice" rule. Indeed, § 201(25)
specifically states that "the time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may
cease to be effective are not determined by this Act." On the other hand under § 4-403(2)
a stop payment order directed to a bank lapses unless renewed every six months. The
analogy may be useful.
101 New York made a similar change in respect to commercial paper in § 3-304 adding sub-
section (7). See Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at pp. 6-7.
102 Supplementary Report, supra note 20, at 16.
103 Sections 8-403, 8-404. Of course it is possible to imagine a case where the issuer would
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The position of the purchaser on the other hand is considerably dif-
ferent. Section 8-304 states certain specific circumstances 104 which are
sufficient as a matter of law to charge the purchaser with notice of ad-
verse claims, and certain classic situations which under the case law
were held to be sufficient for that purpose, as to which the case law is
overruled. 05 But there is no statement that there are no other circum-
stances under which the court or jury may properly find "notice" either
in the sense of "knowledge" or "reason to know," and the writer would
expect the trend of the cases'0 6 imposing somewhat more stringent stand-
ards upon sophisticated purchasers such as banks or brokerage houses
than upon laymen to continue.
As to the New York amendments, the foregoing text includes comment
on all of these except one relatively unimportant one.1'07 In general the
writer thinks that some of these amendments would be useful additions
in substance if not in form to the Uniform text. Others, however, would
simply add redundancy and at least two of the amendments seem designed
to further the parochial interests of their proponents rather than the
public interest, and therefore should be completely rejected. In general,
the action of the Permanent Editorial Board on the amendments seems to
confirm these views. Hopefully that action will have substantial influence
with the New York Commissioners and at the 1963 session of our
Legislature.
have so much "actual knowledge" that any "inquiry" would be irrelevant, e.g., collusion
between an absconding trustee and the officer of the issuer or its transfer agent responsible
for registration of transfer of its securities. Conceivably, under such circumstances regis-
tration might breach the issuer's basic obligation of good faith ["Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."§ 1-203.J and thus import liability. However the case is commercially a highly unlikely one.
104 Indorsement "for collection" or the like or the writing on a bearer form security of
"an unambiguous statement that it is the property of a person other than the transferor."§8-304 (1) (a) (b).
105 Generally, the fiduciary ownership situation, short of knowledge that the proceeds
of the transaction are being misapplied. § 8-304(2).
106 See cases cited supra note 99.
107 A change in § 8-202(5) with respect to the cancellation of "when issued" contracts.
